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CROWHURST v. AMERSHAM BURIAL BOARD.
RECENT ENGLISH

DECISIONS.

High Court of Justice. -xchequer Division.
CROWHURST v. THE AMERSHAM BURIAL BOARD.
If a man knowingly plant in his own land, and suffer to grow over the land of
his neighbor a noxious tree, by which his neighbor's cattle are injured, an action
will lie against him at the suit of such neighbor.

THIS was an appeal by way of special case, from the decision of
the judge of the Buckinghamshire County Court in favor of the
plaintiff.
The facts of the case, the arguments urged on either side, and the
cases cited, appear from the judgment of the court.
. 0. (Grffits,Q. C., and Cooper Wyfd, for the plaintiff.
Herschell, Q. C., and Shaw, for the defendants.
The judgment of the eourt was delivered by
KELLY, C. B.-This is an appeal from the County Court of
Buckinghamshire, held at Chesham. The judgment in the court*
below was for the plaintiff, damages 211., and the judge stated a
case for our opinion.
The material facts of this case are as follows: The defendants,
some seventeen years ago, obtained a piece of land for the purpose
of their cemetery, and fenced it around with a dwarf wall, in which
at two places there were openings filled up with iron railings about
two feet high. Where these railings occurred, the defendants
planted two yew trees, at a distance of about four feet from the railing. These grew through and beyond the railings, so as to project
over an adjoining meadow.
The plaintiff, two years before the alleged cause of action, hired
this meadow to pasture his horses, for a term of three years. After
the plaintiff had occupied the field for two years, his horse, which
was feeding in the meadow, ate of that portion of the yew tree
which projected over the field-the wall and rails not being sufficiently high to prevent a horse from so eating, and died from the
effects of the poison contained in what he ate
The question for our determination is, whether the death of the
horse so occasioned, afforded any cause of action against the defendants.
There being no pleading in the county court, the question is not
in any way affected by the form in which the cause of action is put
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forward, and the facts as found by the judge of the county court
must be taken as conclusive. The only matter, therefore, for our
decision is, whether upon these facts any legal liability is disclosed.
The matter might appear to be somewhat trivial, but the case
gives rise to a question which may not unfrequently arise, and
therefore is of some general importance. Considering this, it is
remarkable that there is an absence of any immediate authority by
which our decision should be governed, and it is, therefore, necessary to determine what are the principles of law properly applicable to it.
Before doing this, it may be well to state shortly what I apprehend to be the effect of the finding of the county court judge. In
the first place, I consider that the judge has so found the facts as
to the planting and growth of the yew trees as to preclude the supposition of mere accident, and that the trees must be taken so to
have been planted and grown with the knowledge of the defendants
as to make them responsible for whatever might be the direct consequence of the original planting.
Secondly, although it is found that the plaintiff saw the horse in
the meadow the day before it died, it is also found that he was not
aware of the existence of the yew trees, and I think it must be
taken that any such negligence on the part of the plaintiff as would
disentitle him to recover is negatived. The mere fact that the
plaintiff saw the horse in the field would go for nothing, and I do
not think that he was bound to examine all the boundaries so as to
see that no tree likely to be injurious to his horse was projecting
over the field he had hired.
It ought also to be noticed that the decision in no way depends
upon any question of fencing or the correlative rights and duties
arising therefrom, and therefore the cases which were cited to us
based upon these afford us no assistance.
The question seems to resolve itself into this: was the act of the
defendants in originally planting the tree, or the omission to keep
it within their own boundary, a legal wrong against the occupiers
of the adjoining field, which, when damage arose from it, would
give the latter a cause of action ?
On the part of the defendants it may be said that the planting
of a yew tree in or near to a fence, and permitting it to grow in
its natural course, is so usual and ordinary that a court of law ought
not to decide that it can be made the subject of an action, especially

850

CROWHURST v. AMERSHAM BURIAL BOARD.

when an adjoining landowner, over whose property it grew, would,
according to the authorities, have the remedy in his own hands by
clipping.
On the other hand, the plaintiff may fairly argue that what was
done was a curtailment of his rights, which, had he known of it,
would prevent his using the field for the purpose for which he had
hired it, or would impose upon him the unusual burden of tethering
or watching his cattle, or of trimming the trees in question, and
although the right so to trim may be conceded, this does not dispose of the case, as the watching to see where trimming would be
necessary and the operation of trimming are burdens which ought
not to be cast upon a neighbor by the acts of an adjoining owner.
It may also be said that if the tree were innocuous, it might well
be held, from grounds of general convenience, that the occupier of
the land projected over would have no right of action, but should
be left to protect himself by clipping. Such projections are innumerable throughout the country, and no such action has ever been
maintained; but the occupier ought, from similar grounds of geneihal convenience, to be allowed to turn out his cattle, acting upon
the assumption that none but innocuous trees are permitted to project over his land.
The principle by which such a case is to be governed, is carefully expressed in the judgment of the Exchequer Chamber in
.Detcher v. Bylands, Law Rep. 1 Ex. 265, 279, where it is said:
" We think that the true rule of law is, that the person who for
his own purposes brings on his lands-and collects and keeps there
-anything that is likely to do mischief, if it escapes, must keep it
in at his peril; and if he does not do so, is primafacie answerable
for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape."
This statement of the law was cited and approved of in the judg
ment of the House of Lords in the same case.
In .Fetcherv. 1?Bland&, the act of the defendant complained of
was the collecting in a reservoir a large quantity of water, which
burst its bounds and flowed into the plaintiff's mine; but though
the degree of caution required may vary in each particular case,
the principle upon which the duty depends must be the same, and
it has been applied uider many and varied circumstances of a more
ordinary kind, as in Aldred's Case, 9 Rep. 57 b, where the wrong
complained of was the building of a house for hogs so near to the
plaintiff's premises, as to be a nuisance; the laying of lung so high
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as to damage a neighbor: Tenant v. aodwin, 1 Salk. 860; and
others which are cited in Comyn's Digest, tit. "Action on the
case for Nuisance ;" and in the judgment in _letcher v. IByland8;
in all which cases the maxim, " Sic utere tuo ut alienum non
adas," was considered to apply, and those who so interfered with
the enjoyment by their neighbors of their premises, were held
liable.
Other cases of a similar kind may be found in the books. Thus
in Turbervil v. Stamp, 1 Salk. 13,it was held that an action lay by
one whose corn was burnt by the negligent management of a fire
upon his neighbor's ground, although one of the judges did not
agree in the decision, upon the ground that it was usual for farmers
to burn stubble. In Lambert v. Bes8y, Sir T. Raym. 421, the
action was in trespass quare clausum fregit. The defendant
pleaded that he had land adjoining the plaintiff's close, and upon
it a hedge of thorns; that he cut the thorns, and. that they ipso
invito fell upon the plaintiff's land, and the defendant took them off
as soon as he could. On demurrer, judgment was given for the
plaintiff, on the ground that, though a man do a lawful thing, yet
if any damage befalls another, he shall be answerable if he could
have avoided it.
This case was alluded to and approved of by Lord CRANWORTH,
in his judgment in the case of Bylands v. Fletcher, in the House
of Lords, Law Rep. 3 H. L. 330; where he says: "The doctrine
is founded on good sense. For when one person in managing his
own affairs causes, however innocently, damage to another, it is obviously only just that he should be the. party to suffer."
It does not appear from the case what evidence was given in the
county court, to prove either that the defendants knew that yew
trees were poisonous to cattle, or that the fact was common knowledge amongst persons who have to do with cattle. As to the defendants' knowledge it would be immaterial, as whether they knew
it or not they must be held responsible for the natural consequences
of their own act. It is, however, distinctly found by the judge:
"The fact that cattle frequently browse on the leaves and branches
of yew trees when within reach, and not unfrequently are poisoned
thereby, is generally known," and by this finding, which certainly
is in accordance with experience, we are bound.
Several cases were cited during the argument. In two of them,
Lawrence v. Jenkins, Law Rep. 8 Q. B. 274, and Firth v. Bow-
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ling Iron Co., Law Rep. 3 0. P. Div. 254; the liability of
the defendant was based upon his duty to fence. These, therefore, as I have already said, throw no light upon the present question. In Wilson r. NYewbury, Law Rep. 7 Q. B.- 31, which arose
upon demurrer to a declaration, the court merely decided that an
averment that clippings from the defendant's yew tree got upon the
plaintiff's land, was insufficient, without showing that they were
placed there by or with the knowledge of the defendant. Mr. Justice MELLOR, however, in giving judgment says, after alluding to
-Fletcherv. yilands: "If a person brings on to his land things
which have a tendency to escape, and to do mischief, he must take
care that they do not get on his neighbor's land."
Another case which was cited during the argument was that
of Ers zne v. Adene, Law Rep. 8 Ch. 756, in which the Court of
Appeal held that a warranty could not be implied by the lessor of
land let for.agricultural purposes; that there were no plants likely
to be injurious to cattle, such as yew trees, growing on the premises
demised. This decision obviously rests upon grounds foreign to those by which the present case should be determined. I notice it,
therefore, only that I may not appear to have Overlooked it.
In the result I think that the judgment of. the-county court was
correct, and that it should be affirmed with costs.
This is rather a novel application of
the doctrine sic utere tuo, &c. The more
common analogous instances are those
of injuries by the escape of domestic
animals, of fire, water, or building
materials, and such like.
The most difficult question in such
cases alWays is, when is it necessary to
prove actual negligeno3 in the defendant, in order to create i liability; and
1. As to Animals. Itwas doubtlessthe
common law that an owner of cattle is
liable for damages they may do to the
crops of another, if they escape, even
without any negligence on his part. He
was bound to keei them at home at his
peril. See Ellis v. Loflus Iron Co.,
Law Rep. 10 C. P. 10, for a modern
illustration of the familiar doctrine. It
being the natural disposition of animals
to wander away, and stray on to the
lands of other people, and there con-

sume their grass and crops, the owner
was held chargeable with knowledge
of that natural disposition, and so liable, without proof of other negligence
than merely allowing them to trespass.
Besides, such entering upon another's
lands was a trespass, whether in man or
beast, and without any regard to the
intention or negligence of the defendants: Lee v. Riley, 18 C. B. N. S. 722 ;
Decker v. Gammon, 44 Me. 322 ; Dolph
v. Ferris,7 W. & S. 367; Van Leuven
v. Lyke, 1 Comst. 515; Anqus v. Radin,
2 South. 815; Dunckle v. Kocker, 11
Barb. 387. Possibly this might not
apply so strictly to dogs, cats and such
animals. See 17 C. B. N. S. 260, a
very interesting case.
2. As to Fires. There is good authority for saying that the ancient law, or
rather custom of England, appears to
have been that a person in whose house
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a fire originated, either by himself or
his servants,and which afterwards spread
to his neighbor's property and destroyed
it, must make good the loss; and apparently without other proof of negligence. See 1 Ph. Ch. Rep. 316 ; Roll.
Ab., Actie on the case, B., tit. ire;
Bac. Ab., Action on the case. Otherwise there would have been little necessity for the statute, 6 Ann. c. 31, J 6,
passed in 1707, which enacted that after
a future day no action should be maintained against any person in whose
"house or chamber" any fire should
accidentally begin, nor should any
recompense be made by such person
for any damage suffered or occasioned
thereby. This was subsequently extended so as to include any fire accidentally begun in any one's "stable,
barn or other building, orestate :" st. 12
Geo. 3, c. 73, and 14 Gen. 3, c. 78.
See also st. 7 & 8 Vict. c. 84, s. I ; the
word "estate" clearly applying to land
not built upon, and making the owner
of such land not liable in the same manner as it previously had the owner of
buildings. Since those statutes, therefore, it has always been held necessary.
in England to allege and prove some
negligence on the part of the defendant
or his servants, in order to charge him;
and if that exists, he is liable. See
Vaughan v. Menlove, 3 Bing. N. C.
468 ; 4 Scott 244 (1837) ; K-lliter v.
Phippard, 11 Q. B. 347 (1847). A fire
cannot be "accidentally" begun, which
arises from the defendant's negligence:
Webb v. Rome, 4-c., Railroad Co., 49 N.
Y. 420 (1872).
And it has been held that those early
English statutes form a part of the common law of this country: Lansing v.
Stone, 37 Barb. 15 (1862); Spaulding
v. C. 4- N. Railroad Co., 30 Wis. 110.
But whether that be so or not, and
whatever the common law of England
may have at one time been, it seems to
be uniformly established in this coun.ry, that if one kindles a fire on his own
VOL. XXVI.-45

premises, for a lawful purpose, as for
domestic indoor purposes, or to burn
brash, fallow, &c., in the field, he is
not liable for its escape, unless some
negligence be actually proved, the burden of establishing which being on the
plaintiff, as it is the very gist of his
action. See Clark v. Fort, 8 Johns.
421 ; Stuart v. Hawley, 22 Barb. 619;
Calkins v. Barger, 44 Id. 424; Tourtellott v. Rosebrook, 11 Met. 460; Bachdder v. Heagan, 18 Me. 32; De France
v. Spencer, 2 Iowa 462 ; ahn v. Reichart, 8 Wis. 255 ; Averitt v. Murrell, 4
Jones (N. C.) 323 ; Hanlan v. Ingram,
3 Iowa 81. It may be different if he
kindles a fire without a right to do so;
negligence might not be necessary in
such cases. See Jones v. Festiniog Railway Co., Law Rep. 3 Q. B. 733.
On the same principle it was held by
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in
Raydare v. Knight, 2 W. N. C. 713
(1875), that where the oil in a tank on
the defendant's premises accidentally
caught fire, and overflowed on to the
plaintiff's adjoining land and consumed
his buildings, the defendant was liable,
if the jury found he was guilty of negligence in keeping his tank uncovered and
running his engine with wood, whereby
sparks were emitted from his enginehouse to the tank.
3. As to injuries by escape of water.
Ever since the celebrated case of Rylands
v. Fletcher, even if not before, it has been
the received law of England, that one
who collects and retains water on his
premises by any artificialmeans, and in
larger quantities than nature would furnish, is, primafacie, ordinarily liable, if
such water escape and injure others, and
without other proof of negligence than
the mere escape.
One of the earliest applications of the
doctrine was in Tenant v. Goidwin, I
Salk. 360; 2 Ld. Raym. 1089 ; in which
it was held that if the defendant had a
privy near the plaintiff's land, and was
bound by law to keep the wall in repair,
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but for want thereof filth soaked
through into the plaintiff's premises,
he was liable, for he was bound to keep
his filth at home. Ball v. Nle, 99 Mass.
582 (1868)2 is very similar and decided
the same way. and see .Fodgkinson v.
Ennor, 4 B. & S. 229; Humphries v.
Cousins, Law Rep. 2 C. P. Div. 239.
This distinction as to non-liability for
escape of water which falls naturally
upon the defendant's land, and escapes
iiaturally therefrom, and as to liability
for that which is artificiallyaccumulated,
or brought into the defendant's land, was
fully established in the well-considered
eases in the Common Pleas of Smith v.
Kenrick, 7 C. B. 515 (1849), and Baird
v. Williamsom 15 C. B. N. S. 376
(1863). See also, Smith v. Fletcher, Law
Rep. 7 Ex. 305 (1872).
The recent case of ffardman v. North
Eastern Railway Co., 3 C. P. Div. 168
.(1878), furnishes an intsresting application of this rule. The plaintiff owned
a dwelling-house adjoining a railway,
and separated from .it by a wall built
and maintained by the company. They
had piled up heaps of dirt and rubbish
against this wall, and the rain falling
on it percolated through the wall and
injured the plaintiff's house adjoining,
dampening the walls and paper thereon,
&c. It being alleged to have been negligently and improperly deposited by
the defendants, the Court of Appeal
decided ihat a good cause of action was
set forth in the declaration, and they
said the piling up the rubbish must be
considered an "artificial structure,"
within the rule of Fletcher v. RBylands.
And see Broder v. Saillard, 2 Ch. Div.
700.
The rule laid down in Rylands v.
Fletcher, was dissented from in Brown v.
Collins, 53 N. H. 442 (1873), although
the decision did not necessarily involve
exactly the same point: but it was fully
approved in the well-reasoned case of
Cahillv. Eastman, 18 Minn. 324 (1872),
holding that a party is liable for the

natural and necessary consequences of
his acts on his own land, without regard
to his care and skill in conducting them.
See also, Selden v. Delaware 6- Hudson
Canal Co., 24 Barb. 362.
Rylandsv. Fletcherwas also questioned
in Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N. Y. 487,
and said to be in direct conflict with the
law as settled in this country, and it
was there decided that if a steam-boiler
on the defendant's premises.explodes,
and pieces thereof are thrown on to the
plaintiff's adjoining premises, and destroys his property, the defendant is not
liable without proof of negligence; but
the case did not necessarily decide that
the negligence must be proved aliunds
from the fact itself. See 57 N. Y. 567,
On the other hand, in PixDWIGHT, C.
ley v. Clark, 35 N. Y. 520, it was held
that the owner of an artificial pond was
liable to an adjacent owner, into whose
lands the water percolated under the
surface, and without any proof of negligence. And see Wilson v. New Bedford, 108 Mass. 261, though this case
was under a statute.
But whether one who artificially collects and stores water on his premises,
is or is not liable for its escape, without
proof of some negligence, all agree,
even the English courts, that if the escape is due to the act of God, vis major,
as an extraordinaryfreshet, which could
not reasonably be anticipated, the owner
is not liable, if guilty of no negligence.
Nichols v. Marsland, 2 Ex. Div. 1 ;
affirming s. a. in Law Rep. 10 Ex. 255,
a very important case; and limiting the
application of Fletcher v. Rlands, and
holding that vias major, or the act of some
third person, which the owner had no
reason to anticipate, may sometimes
excuse him from responsibility. See
Mahoney v. Libbey, 123 Mass. 2Z and.23;
Gorhamv. Gross, 125 Mass. 238.
4. As to fall of building material and
the like. The owner of a building adjoining a highway, is prima fade liable, if
the building falls and injures a passer-by.

